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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN H. SWAYNE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, 
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 880177-CA 
Category No. 7 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff and Appellant requests that a rehearing be 
granted in this action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35 of 
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. This petition is made 
for the reason that the Court misapprehended the Petitioner's 
claims in two ways. First, the Court overlooked the fact that 
Mr. Swayne has adopted his infant daughter by acknowledgement 
and, therefore, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) 
cannot be applied as a basis for terminating his parental 
rights. Second, the Court erred in holding that Mr. Swayne had 
no parental rights subject: to termination. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
POINT I* AS STEVEN SWAYNE ADOPTED HIS DAUGHTER BY 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4(3) 
CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR TERMINATION OF HIS 
PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-12 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) provides 
that the father of an illegitimate child can legitimate the 
child "from the time of its birthM by publicly acknowledging 
his paternity and receiving it into his family. Steven Swayne 
has satisfied these statutory requirements for his daughter, 
and had done so prior to her relinquishment by her natural 
mother. Accordingly, the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) are not applicable to Mr. Swayne 
because he is not the father of an illegitimate child. 
Both in the trial court and in this Court (Appellant's 
Brief at pp. 15-18), Steven Swayne asserted that he did all 
that was required to adopt his daughter by acknowledgement. He 
openly acknowledged his paternity, was present at birth, 
visited her in the hospital, took the child into his home and 
family and treated her in all ways as his legitimate 
offspring. Thus, as a different panel of this Court held in In 
Re T.R.F. v. Felan, P.2d , 90 UAR 36 (Utah App. 1988), 
Many filing of a petition for adoption after an unwed father 
has met the statutory requirement, and with only the mother's 
consent, is a legal nullity.11 90 UAR at 39. The trial court 
made no finding on this issue, however, because Mr. Swayne 
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if the statutory 
didn't file an acknowledgement of paternity before 
relinquishment, and, as the Utah Supreme Court held, 
unequivocally, in Ellis v. Social Services Dep't. of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 
1980), Min order to protect his rights under U.C.A., 1953, 
78-30-12, the putative father must file a(notice of paternity 
with the Bureau." 615 P.2d at 1254. Obviously, the "rights" 
referred to could only require protection 
requirements had already been met, otherwise there would be no 
"rights" to protect. 
T.R.F. rejected this holding, however, because to 
actually apply the requirement of filing $ notice would be 
unconstitutional. "The language of Ellis need not be read, and 
indeed cannot constitutionally be read, t<> require a putative 
father to file a notice of paternity priof to the filing of the 
petition for adoption in a case such as this when the putative 
father has previously acknowledged the chf.ld within the meaning 
of the acknowledgement statute." 90 UAR kt 39. Therefore, in 
T.R.F., another panel of this Court noted the very problem in 
the Ellis reasoning which Mr. Swayne presented in his brief and 
simply chose to "modify" that portion of the opinion which 
expressly required the filing of a notice!of paternity before 
relinquishment in every case where the father of the 
illegitimate child sought to protect his parental rights. 
Under the law as announced in T.R.F., before the defendants in 
this case would have been entitled to summary judgment in the 
Court below they would have had to establish that Mr. Swayne 
had not adopted his daughter by acknowledgement. If he had, 
then T.R.F. expressly holds just what Mr. Swayne has asserted 
below and in this Court, that it would be constitutionally 
impermissible to apply the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4(3) to him. 
In Swayne, this Court stated if Man unwed father 
establishes a substantial relationship over a number of years'* 
he is protected by 78-30-12. However, the statute requires no 
such duration for the relationship (which it would be 
manifestly impossible to have with a five-day-old child). It 
only requires "(1) public acknowledgement by the father, (2) 
receipt of the child into the father's family and (3) treatment 
of the child as legitimate." T.R.F., supra., at 38. That 
panel of this Court acknowledged that this statute, and others 
like it, have always been given liberal construction and only 
require public acknowledgement by the father to his family and 
friends that the child is his, coupled with visits with the 
child in his home or wherever the child resides, no matter how 
brief. The uncontradicted evidence in this case demonstrated 
that Mr. Swayne publicly acknowledged his paternity both before 
and after the child's birth. He informed his family who held a 
baby shower for the mother. He was present at the birth of the 
child in the delivery room where he claimed paternity. He 
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visited the child every day it was in the hospital and also in 
his own home. He expressed willingness to take the child if 
the mother chose to relinquish custody. Whether the Court 
finds his actions toward the child's mother laudable or not is 
irrelevant. The judgment entered below cannot be sustained 
consistently with the law as announced in T.R.F., nor can the 
statute be applied constitutionally if the holding of T.R.F. is 
ignored. 
In this action, this Court should either find as a 
matter of law that the undisputed facts demonstrate adoption by 
acknowledgement and reverse the judgment below or should 
reverse the judgment and remand for findings on the question of 
Mr. Swayne's compliance with the adoption by acknowledgement 
statute. 
POINT II. AN UNWED FATHER HAS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
RIGHTS IN HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS NEWBORN 
INFANT. I 
This Court's rejection of Mr. Swayne's substantive due 
process claim was based upon the holding ihat the "statute 
cannot create an irrebuttable presumption of abandonment where 
parental rights do not exist." Slip.Op. it 12. The assertion 
that a biological father of a newborn illegitimate child has no 
parental rights is totally inconsistent with the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 
(1983), where the Court explained at some length that the 
biological father has a constitutionally protected interest in 
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being accorded the opportunity to form a true parental 
relationship with his child. Whether this right is 
characterized as an "inchoate right" or an "opportunity 
interest" is unimportant. What is important is that it cannot 
be forfeited in a manner which does not comply with due 
process. Therefore, this Court's assertion that an unwed 
father "does not have parental rights subject to termination 
until he asserts them" is flatly inconsistent with the teaching 
of Lehr. 
Finally, this Court's "finding" that Mr. Swayne had 
actual knowledge of the requirement to register his paternity 
to protect his parental rights (Slip.Op. at 15) is contrary to 
all the evidence and a prior stipulation of the parties. This 
Court is not free to make factual findings inconsistent with 
the evidence, apparently basing its "finding" on the lack of 
credibility of a witness never seen nor heard. 
The Court's further assertion that Mr. Swayne must 
have known of the registration procedure because of his prior 
relinquishment of a different child must be based on 
assumptions which are neither of record nor true. Mr. Swayne's 
prior relinquishment occurred when L.D.S. Social Services 
solicited his consent to placement of a child born in 
New Mexico, who he had not publicly acknowledged as his child. 
He never filed any form of registration as the child's parent, 
yet his consent for adoption was sought. If this experience 
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imparts any knowledge it would be that an unwed father's 
consent is always required. This Court's "finding" that 
Mr. Swayne's prior experience imparted knowledge of the Utah 
filing requirement is extrinsic to the record, was not 
advocated by the respondents, and is simpiy wrong. 
CONCLUSION 
When Mr. Swayne filed the present action he alleged he 
was the child's natural father, that he h^d publicly 
acknowledged this fact and that in the brief period between the 
child's birth and her surrender to strangers he had as 
substantial a relationship as one can with a five-day-old 
baby. He alleged that these facts entitled him to custody. He 
argued in the trial court that he had done all that Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-30-12 required to adopt by acknowledgement and that 
§ 78-30-4(3) could not be constitutionally applied to him as a 
basis for terminating his parental rights. The decision of 
this Court, while not addressing Mr. Swayne's compliance with 
the provisions of § 78-30-12, simply assumes that he had no 
rights under that statute. Such a presumption is erroneous and 
requires rehearing and reversal of the judgment entered below 
as occurred in T.R.F. 
DATED this d*L»J day of September, 1988. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
M. Dgvid Ecker 
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Billfe/L. Walker/et. / 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH 
M. David Eckersley, counsel for Plaintiff and 
Appellant, hereby certifies, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
35(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, that this 
Petition for Rehearing is filed in good faith and not for delay. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
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correct copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING to the 
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